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“No License, No Problem”—Is Qualcomm’s Ninth Circuit Antitrust 
Victory a Patent Exhaustion Defeat? 
 
Jorge L. Contreras* 
 
The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in FTC v. Qualcomm1 is generally viewed as a resounding 
victory for Qualcomm.  In a strongly worded opinion, the Ninth Circuit reversed the entirety of 
the district court’s holding,2 which found that Qualcomm violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act.  The Ninth Circuit exonerated Qualcomm with respect to each of its allegedly anticompetitive 
practices, concluding that these practices merely reflected the flexing of Qualcomm’s “economic 
muscle” with admirable “vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity.”3 
 
Among Qualcomm’s challenged practices was its refusal to license rival chip makers under patents 
that are essential to one or more wireless telecommunications standards (standards-essential 
patents or SEPs).  While the District Court found that this refusal violated Qualcomm’s antitrust 
duty to deal under Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing 4 the Ninth Circuit disagreed.  It 
reasoned that Qualcomm did not violate any duty to deal because it uniformly refused to grant 
patent licenses to chip makers and did not “single[] out any specific chip supplier for 
anticompetitive treatment.”5  
 
In praising Qualcomm’s egalitarian approach toward rival chip makers, the Ninth Circuit points 
out that instead of granting licenses to these rivals, Qualcomm merely “declines to enforce its 
patents” against them “even though they practice Qualcomm’s patents.”6 As such, the Ninth Circuit 
quips that Qualcomm’s “policy toward rival chipmakers could be characterized as ‘no license, no 
problem.’”7 Yet, as I discuss below, this approach could actually be a very big problem, not only 
for Qualcomm, but for all patent licensors seeking to extract revenue from the most lucrative point 
in the supply chain. 
 
A. The Patent Exhaustion Doctrine and Chip Sales 
 
As the Supreme Court explained in Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics,8 “The longstanding  
doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates 
all patent rights to that item.”9  That is, once the patent holder or its authorized licensee sells a 
product covered by a patent, that patent can no longer be asserted against a downstream buyer or 
user of the product. The patent is “exhausted” with respect to that particular product.   
 
 
* Presidential Scholar and Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. 
1 FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020). 
2 See FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F.Supp.3d 658 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
3 Qualcomm, 969 F.3d at 1005. 
4 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
5 Qualcomm, 969 F.3d at 995. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. (emphasis added). 
8 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
9 Id. at 625. 
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In Quanta, LG licensed three patents to Intel.  Intel manufactured chips allegedly covered by the 
patents, then sold the chips to Quanta for incorporation into Quanta’s PCs. LG then attempted to 
assert the patents against Quanta.  The court held that so long as the Intel chips “substantially 
embodied the patent[s]”, they were exhausted upon Intel’s sale of the chips to Quanta.10 LG had 
no right to assert the patents against Intel’s customer Quanta. 
 
B. Level Discrimination and SEPs 
 
To grossly oversimplify, the supply chain for standardized wireless telecommunications 
functionality can be divided into three relevant tiers: (1) standards developers, (2) chip 
manufacturers, and (3) end user device (e.g., smartphone) manufacturers.  Standards developers 
like Qualcomm cooperate within standards-development bodies to create telecommunications 
standards like 4G LTE. Chip manufacturers then implement these standards in chipsets, which 
they sell to device manufacturers for incorporation into smartphones and other consumer devices.   
 
What happens, however, when a standards developer like Qualcomm holds patents (SEPs) that 
cover a standard like LTE?  In theory, both the chips embodying the standard and the smartphones 
incorporating those chips infringe its SEPs.  Thus the SEP holder could choose to license those 
SEPs at either Tier 2 (chip manufacturers) or Tier 3 (device manufacturers). How to choose?  
 
If a SEP holder licenses a chip manufacturer, then its SEPs covering a particular chip will be 
exhausted as soon as the manufacturer sell that chip to a device manufacturer, just as LG’s patents 
were exhausted in Quanta.  This means that if the SEP holder licenses a Tier 2 chip manufacturer, 
it cannot separately license, or collect royalties from, Tier 3 smartphone manufacturers for the 
same SEPs.  Qualcomm was keenly aware of the risk of patent exhaustion, which is why it refused 
to grant “exhaustive” licenses to chip makers like Intel.11  
 
If SEP royalties were standardized on a per-unit basis (e.g. $0.50 per product embodying the 
standard), then it would not matter whether the SEP holder licensed its SEPs at Tier 2 or Tier 3.  
In either case it would receive the same payment.  However, due to longstanding industry practice, 
that is not how SEP royalties are calculated. Instead, they are usually based on some percentage 
(say 2.5%) of the price of the product embodying the standard.  So for a 4G LTE wireless radio 
chipset priced at $30, the royalty would be $0.75.  But for a $600 iPhone incorporating that chipset, 
the royalty would be $15.  For this reason, SEP holders strongly prefer to license their SEPs to end 
device makers (Tier 3).  As explained by one Ericsson licensing executive, “we choose to license 
the patents as late in value chain as possible …. One big advantage with this strategy is also that it 
is likely that the royalty income will be higher since we calculate the royalty on a more expensive 
product.”12 Or, as more succinctly expressed by a Qualcomm attorney at trial, licensing SEPs to 
device makers is “humongously” more lucrative than licensing  them to chip makers.13 The practice 
by which a SEP holder licenses its SEPs at only one tier of the supply chain is sometimes called 
 
10 Id. at 633. 
11 FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F.Supp.3d 658, 748, 761 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
12 Florian Müller, Ericsson Explained Publicly Why It Collects Patent Royalties From Device (Not Chipset) Makers, 
FOSS PATENTS (Jan. 29, 2014, 9:02 AM), http://www.fosspatents.com/2014/01/ericsson-explained-publicly-why-
its.html. 
13 Qualcomm, 411 F.Supp.3d at 754, 758, 796. 
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“level discrimination.” (Courts and commentators disagree whether level discrimination is 
permitted under the nondiscrimination prong of a FRAND commitment14). 
 
C. Pseudo-Licensing Deals with Chip Makers 
 
If a SEP holder licenses its SEPs at Tier 3, what happens to the Tier 2 chip manufacturer? Does 
the chip that embodies the standard infringe the SEPs? Yes, probably. Patent exhaustion only 
works downstream, not upstream.  That is, a smartphone manufacturer can’t infringe a SEP if it 
purchases a chipset from a licensed chip maker.  But a chip manufacturer can infringe a SEP even 
if its customer (the smartphone maker) has a license to use it.  Without a license, the Tier 2 chip 
maker is exposed to infringement claims by the SEP holder.  
 
So what’s a chip maker to do?  Should it manufacture and sell chipsets that embody a standard 
even though it knows that it is infringing a host of SEPs?  Wouldn’t this infringement be willful, 
subjecting the chip maker to a risk of treble damages?15  It seems like an untenable situation for a 
chip maker.  
 
To address this situation, Qualcomm appears to have developed various strategies.  In the 1990s, 
it granted chip makers purportedly “non-exhaustive licenses” that permitted them to manufacture 
chipsets covered by Qualcomm’s SEPs (in exchange for a royalty), but which explicitly excluded 
any license rights for the purchasers of those chipsets.16 In Quanta, the Supreme Court rejected 
such a “non-exhaustive” arrangement between LG and Intel, holding that LG’s patent rights were 
exhausted upon Intel’s sale of covered chips to Quanta.  After this, Qualcomm amended its 
practices and began to enter into “CDMA ASIC Agreements” with chip makers. Under these 
agreements, “Qualcomm promises not to assert its patents in exchange for the company promising 
not to sell its chips to unlicensed [smartphone manufacturers].”17 According to the Ninth Circuit, 
these agreements “allow Qualcomm’s competitors to practice Qualcomm’s SEPs royalty-free.”18 
Or, as the court pithily observed, Qualcomm’s “policy toward rival chipmakers could be 
characterized as ‘no license, no problem.’”19  
 
The Ninth Circuit found that because Qualcomm applied its “no license, no problem” policy 
uniformly toward all rival chip makers, it did not violate the antitrust laws.  But did Qualcomm, 
instead, open the door to a finding that its patents are exhausted at the chip maker level? 
 
D. Do SEP Makers Inadvertently Grant Exhaustive Licenses to Chip Makers? 
 
As observed by the Ninth Circuit, Qualcomm “promises not to assert” its SEPs against chip 
 
14 See Jorge L. Contreras & Anne Layne-Farrar, Non-Discrimination and FRAND Commitments, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW, VOLUME 1: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST AND PATENTS 186 (Jorge 
Contreras ed., 2018).  
15 For a discussion of willful infringement of SEPs see Jorge L. Contreras et al., The Effect of FRAND Commitments 
on Patent Remedies, in PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS 160, 162-63 
(C. Bradford Biddle, et al., eds., 2019). 
16 FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974, 984 n.7 (9th Cir. 2020). 
17 Id. at 984 (emphasis added). 
18 Id. at 985. 
19 Id. at 995. 
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makers.  Its CDMA ASIC Agreements allow chip makers “to practice Qualcomm’s SEPs royalty-
free”.  Ericsson, which employs a similar form of level discrimination, has referred to the result as 
“indirect licensing” of chip manufacturers.20  
 
In assessing whether a patent has been licensed, courts have generally looked beyond the language 
used by the parties.  As the Supreme Court reasoned in De Forest Radio Telephone Co. v. United 
States,21 “No formal granting of a license is necessary in order to give it effect. Any language used 
by the owner of the patent, or any conduct on his part exhibited to another from which that other 
may properly infer that the owner consents to his use of the patent in making or using it, or selling 
it, upon which the other acts, constitutes a license.”22  
 
A number of lower court cases have equated a license to a ‘covenant not to sue’.  As the Federal 
Circuit held in Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Genetics Institute,23 “A license may amount to no 
more than a covenant by the patentee not to sue the licensee for making, using or selling the 
patented invention.”24   
 
Given this precedent, SEP holders’ practice of tacitly permitting chip manufacturers to operate 
under their patents, whether by promising not to assert or “indirectly” licensing, looks suspiciously 
like licensing.  And, if SEP holders are granting chip manufacturers licenses to make and sell chips 
under their SEPs, then those SEPs should, by rights, be exhausted upon the sale of those chips to 
smartphone and other device manufacturers.  And this exhaustion should thereby prevent SEP 
holders from seeking to license and collect royalties from Tier 3 device manufacturers who 
incorporate those chips into their smartphones and other products. 
 
This result should come as no surprise to anyone, least of all Qualcomm.  According to the District 
Court, a Qualcomm executive admitted to the IRS in 2012 that “if Qualcomm licensed a rival [chip 
manufacturer] … ‘[W]hen [the rival] sell[s] that chip to somebody who's going to put the chip in 
a cell phone, okay, the licensee's sale of that chip will exhaust our rights and then we won't be able 
to collect a royalty on a cell phone that's based on the price of the cellphone.’”25 When Huawei 
apparently asserted that Qualcomm’s SEPs were exhausted after selling chips to Huawei, 
Qualcomm allegedly “threatened to cut off [Huawei’s] chip supply.”26 
 
These statements and actions indicate that Qualcomm was well-aware of the threat of patent 
exhaustion, and actually took measures to avoid the appearance of exhaustion (e.g., by converting 
its chip maker license agreements into CDMA ASIC Agreements).  Yet in trying to rebut the 
antitrust allegations made against it, and to overturn the District Court’s antitrust holdings, 
Qualcomm seems to have persuaded the Ninth Circuit that it effectively grants licenses to rival 
chip manufacturers. And, in doing so, Qualcomm may have armed its next smartphone licensee 
with a potent exhaustion defense to any claim of infringement.  Ultimately, “no license, no 
 
20 See Ericsson v. D-Link, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110585, *80 (E.D. Tx. 2013)). 
21 De Forest Radio Telephone Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236 (1927). 
22 Id. at 241. 
23 Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Genetics Institute, Inc., 52 F.3d 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
24 Id. at 1031. 
25 FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F.Supp.3d 658, 796 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
26 Id. at 712. 
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problem” may cause big problems for Qualcomm and other SEP holders that seek to license only 
at the most lucrative level of the supply chain. 
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